The Indian Constitution contains elaborate emergency provisions to enable the President to meet any extraordinary situation effectively. These provisions are designed to safeguard the sovereignty, unity, integrity, and security of the country, the democratic political system, and the Constitution.

Types of Emergencies

The Constitution envisages three types of emergencies:

1. National Emergency (Article 352)

– Grounds for Declaration: The President can declare a national emergency when the security of India or a part of it is threatened by war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. The President can also declare an emergency before the actual occurrence of these events if there is an imminent danger.

– Effects: During a national emergency, the Central government becomes all-powerful, and the states come under the total control of the Centre. This converts the federal structure into a unitary one without a formal amendment of the Constitution.

– Historical Declarations: National emergencies have been declared three times so far—in 1962 (Chinese aggression), 1971 (war with Pakistan), and 1975 (internal disturbance).

2. State Emergency (President’s Rule) (Article 356)

– Grounds for Declaration: The President can impose President’s Rule in a state on the grounds of the failure of the constitutional machinery in the state or failure to comply with the directions of the Centre.

– Effects: The President can take over the functions of the state government and the powers vested in the governor or any other executive authority in the state. The state legislative assembly can be dissolved or suspended, and the Parliament assumes the power to make laws for the state.

3. Financial Emergency (Article 360)

– Grounds for Declaration: The President can declare a financial emergency if he is satisfied that the financial stability or credit of India or any part of its territory is threatened.

– Effects: During a financial emergency, the President can reduce or cancel the transfer of finances from the Centre to the states and can direct the states to observe financial propriety.

Extent and Boundaries of Emergency Powers

The emergency provisions in the Indian Constitution have been a subject of intense debate and criticism. Some members of the Constituent Assembly criticized these provisions on the following grounds:

– Destruction of Federal Character: The federal character of the Constitution would be destroyed, and the Union would become all-powerful.

– Concentration of Powers: The powers of the state would be concentrated in the hands of the Union executive.

– Dictatorial Powers: The President would become a dictator.

– Financial Autonomy: The financial autonomy of the states would be nullified.

– Fundamental Rights: Fundamental rights would become meaningless, and the democratic foundations of the Constitution would be destroyed.

For instance, H.V. Kamath feared that the emergency provisions would lay the foundation of a totalitarian state, a police state, where the rights and liberties of millions of innocent men and women would be in continuous jeopardy. K.T. Shah described them as a chapter of reaction and retrogression, arming the Centre with special powers against the units and the government against the people.

However, there were also proponents of the emergency provisions. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar labeled them as the very life-breath of the Constitution, and Mahabir Tyagi opined that they would work as a safety-valve, helping in the maintenance of the Constitution.

Judicial Oversight of Emergency Powers

The judiciary plays a crucial role in monitoring the use of emergency powers to prevent their misuse. The scope of judicial review in the context of emergency provisions has evolved over time.

National Emergency:

– Judicial Review: Initially, the declaration of a national emergency was immune from judicial review. However, the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 deleted this provision, allowing the courts to review the proclamation of a national emergency.

– Minerva Mills Case (1980): The Supreme Court held that the proclamation of a national emergency could be challenged in court on the grounds of malafide or that the declaration was based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant facts or is absurd or perverse.

President’s Rule

– Judicial Review: The 38th Amendment Act of 1975 made the satisfaction of the President in invoking Article 356 final and conclusive, which could not be challenged in any court. However, this provision was deleted by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, implying that the satisfaction of the President is not beyond judicial review.

– Bommai Case (1994): The Supreme Court laid down several propositions regarding the imposition of President’s Rule.

– The presidential proclamation imposing President’s Rule is subject to judicial review.

– The satisfaction of the President must be based on relevant material. The action of the President can be struck down by the court if it is based on irrelevant or extraneous grounds or if it was found to be malafide or perverse.

– The burden lies on the Centre to prove that relevant material exists to justify the imposition of President’s Rule.

– The court cannot go into the correctness of the material or its adequacy but can see whether it is relevant to the action.

– If the court holds the presidential proclamation to be unconstitutional and invalid, it has the power to restore the dismissed state government and revive the state legislative assembly if it was suspended or dissolved.

– The state legislative assembly should be dissolved only after the Parliament has approved the presidential proclamation. Until such approval is given, the President can only suspend the assembly. In case the Parliament fails to approve the proclamation, the assembly would get reactivated.

– Secularism is one of the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution. Hence, a state government pursuing anti-secular politics is liable to action under Article 356.

– The question of the state government losing the confidence of the legislative assembly should be decided on the floor of the House, and until that is done, the ministry should not be unseated.

– Where a new political party assumes power at the Centre, it will not have the authority to dismiss ministries formed by other parties in the states.

– The power under Article 356 is an exceptional power and should be used only occasionally to meet the requirements of special situations.