World History

Appeasement and the Causes of WW2

The idea of appeasement, especially as it relates to the 1930s, involves a diplomatic strategy of acceding to the demands of an autocratic power to prevent hostilities. Western democracies, especially Britain and France, notably practiced this policy in dealing with Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Italy under Mussolini and Japan. Such was the cause of appeasement founded in the changes of the aftermath of World War 1, the economic turmoil, the political ideologies, and international isolationism. This article will look at these reasons and consider how appeasement contributed to the cause of World War II.

Reasons for the Policy of Appeasement

The Aftermath of World War I:

War Guilt and Reparations: The Treaty of Versailles, which was agreed upon in 1919, imposed harsh penalties on Germany, including heavy reparations, financial Compensation, loss of territory and military restrictions. This led many in Britain and France to see these terms as too harsh, thinking that lightening the load on Germany was key to ensuring no more conflicts in the future.

War-weary Populace: There was an intense sense of weariness in the populations of Britain and France as a result of the Great War. The spectre of war loomed large after the disaster of the first World War and led to a general desire to avoid another similar catastrophe at all costs, thus making the notion of appeasement easier to digest.

Economic Turmoil:

The Great Depression: The worldwide financial catastrophe of the 1930s. Britain and France, like other countries, were facing high unemployment, economic instability and social discontent. Also alarming were the costs and the possible economic disruption of yet another war.

Trade and Economic Interest Thought good relations with Germany and Italy would protect trade and economic interest. Pursuing appeasement was perceived as a means of safeguarding these interests and perhaps even promoting economic recovery.

Political Ideologies:

Pacifism: The horrors of World War I had led to a vigorous pacifist movement in Britain and France. That made the politically easier choice appeasement, because many politicians and citizens were ardently against the idea of military confrontation.

Fascism and Anticommunism: Among conservative politicians especially, fascism was seen—in its most complimentary form—as an unpleasant but necessary evil in the world to keep communism at bay. This sentiment was compounded by the ferocious expansion of Soviet Russia and fear of a communist uprising in Europe.

International Isolationism:

United States: After World War I, the U.S. followed a policy of isolationism. It did not join the League of Nations and it focused on domestic concerns. And this also pulled back much of the pressure on Britain and France not to take as hard a line on the continent.

(The League of Nations) The League of Nations was intended for the prevention of future warfare, it was quite a robust construct, but it lacked teeth owing to the absence of U.S. and Soviet powers as members. This weakness shook confidence in collective security and made appeasement a more promising alternative.

Military Inadequacies:

Delays in Rearmament: As countries defensive against the Nazis,[14] Britain and France were slow to rearm after World War I, and Ultranationalist military capabilities were not enough to face Hitler becoming stronger militarily. A fear of being unprepared for another war also factored into the decision not to provoke Germany.

Strategic Miscalculations: There was a widespread belief that Hitler’s demands were limited and that he could be controlled through diplomacy. This error resulted in a succession of capitulations, including the 1938 Munich Agreement permitting German annexation of the Sudetenland.

Appeasement and the Outbreak of World War II

Emboldening Hitler:

Hitler was greatly emboldened by the Munich Agreement and other acts of appeasement. Every concession he was given convinced him that the West was too cowardly to oppose his aggression, which led him to make further demands and eventually to the invasion of Poland in 1939.

Appeasement did not stop Hitler and only gave him time and resources to build up his military and fortify his position.

Weakening Allied Resolve:

The ongoing appeasement of Germany and Italy sapped the will of Britain and France. It fostered among the public scepticism and lack of confidence which hindered action to present a united and determined front to fascist aggression.

European resolve was also weakened by the absence of a unified, if not strong, foreign policy from the Western democracies that lost confidence also from the smaller states, resulting in a chain of appeasements and capitulations.

Erosion of Collective Security:

Politically, the impotence of the League of Nations in handling the belligerence of totalitarian regimes was a stark reminder of the inadequacies of collective security. The policy of appeasement has damaged the credibility of the League and other international organizations even more.

The inability to respond collectively to breaches of international law and norms made it easier for Germany, Italy and Japan to pursue their expansionist goals with little fear of significant international consequences.

Missing an Opportunity for Peace:

Appeasement, which sought to preserve peace, did exactly the opposite. By failing to draw a clear line in the sand earlier, the Western democracies forfeited the ability to negotiate from strength and thus had the chance to avoid war.

Had the US opposed fascist aggression and supported the armed struggle against fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, a world war through the 1940s may have been avoided, or at the very least the war might have mitigated or diminished some of the horrors that afflicted the European continent.

Moral and Ethical Failures:

The moral and ethical failures of the policy of appeasement have drawn significant criticism. These democracies enabled these totalitarian regimes to gain power and strength by turning a blind eye to their atrocities.

The failure to take a stand against fascism in its early stages led into the genocide of the Holocaust and other genocides that could have been averted, or at a minimum contained, with more muscular international action.

Conclusion

The appeasement of the totalitarian regimes in the 30s was driven by an interplay of historical, economic, political, and military strategic factors. The goal, initially, was not to repeat the mistakes that had caused another world-shattering war, but the policy was a failure. Rather, it emboldened fascist leaders, hardened Allied buttresses and eroded collective security. The outbreak of World War II can also be viewed as a direct result of the inability of appeasement. The lessons of this era reinforce the need for strong, united, principled responses to aggressive and expansionist regimes while warning against the perils of appeasing totalitarianism.