Answer: Recently, the State Government of Haryana provided for 75% reservation to locals in private sector jobs that offered a monthly salary of less than Rs. 30,000. This move is seen as a contravention of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution pertaining to the Right to Equality and Article 19 pertaining to the Right to Freedom. However, these objections to domicile based reservation laws in the private sector on grounds of Constitutional equality and freedom are misplaced as:

• Article 14 allows classifying the people into two groups if such classification is reasonable and is made to achieve specific ends. The only condition is that the classification must not be “arbitrary, artificial or evasive”. It must always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
• In D.P Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra (1955) case, the SC held that Article 15 does not bar domicile-based reservation. Further, Article 16 provides protection only in public employment and not private employment.
• Article 19 does not provide absolute freedom to private companies against the State’s regulations upon their business activities. By virtue of Article 19(6), the State can impose “reasonable restrictions” on trade, business, occupation or profession in “the interests of the general public”.
• The Government of Haryana had argued that the law merely makes “geographical classification”, which is permitted under the Constitution. It is to protect the right to life/livelihood of people domiciled in the state and to protect their health, living conditions and their right to employment.

On the other hand, there is a need to take into consideration some objections before implementing domicile-based reservation:

• Fuels sons-of-the-soil syndrome: Employment is one of the principal reasons behind migration and shutting the doors on employment to non-domiciles would be a gross violation of not just the Fundamental Rights of citizens but would also open a Pandora’s box where other states might follow suit.
• Stifle the labour market: Such reservation may push businesses to migrate, as their skilled workforce is not sufficiently ‘local’. Additionally, smaller entities may find it difficult to carry on, once the new law comes into force due to increased compliance costs.
• Revival of license raj: Many experts believe that allowing reservations in the private sector would be akin to nationalization of the private sector and it would result in the revival of license-raj.

The rise in regional inequalities (east vis-a-vis west and south) since the 1990s has deepened social divisions, with migration largely headed towards the western and southern states where infrastructure is better developed. The setting up of educational and skills institutions in backward areas can bridge this gap. Also, the concept of equality under the Constitution is a dynamic concept. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account de facto inequalities that exist in the society, and to take affirmative action by way of giving preference to the socially and economically disadvantaged persons to bring about real equality.

Answer: The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, 1992, provide for the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) as institutions of local self-government in rural and urban areas respectively. The institutions of local self-government (PRIs and ULBs) envisage democratic decentralization and devolution of powers at the grassroots level and detailed provisions for the funds, functions and functionaries are made in the Constitution for their effective functioning. However, the real strength in terms of both autonomy and efficiency of these institutions is dependent on their financial position including their capacity to generate their own resources. The Constitution has empowered the State Legislatures to make specific provisions with respect to the financial matters of the local self-governments. In general, they receive funds in the following ways:

• Own revenue (tax and non-tax): The PRIS and ULBs could be authorised by the State Legislatures to levy, collect and appropriate taxes, duties, tolls and fees.
• Grants from the Union government: Grants are provided to the institutions of local self- government in India by the Union government on the recommendations of the Finance Commission, which is constituted under Article 280 of the Constitution.
• Loans and grant-in-aid: State governments could provide loans and/or grant-in-aid to the PRIs and ULBs from the Consolidated Fund of the State. These grants are intended to be used to support and strengthen the delivery of basic services water supply, sanitation, sewerage and solid waste management, etc.

PRIs and ULBs also receive funds for decentralised planning and state-sponsored schemes through devolutions made by the state government. This devolution from the state government is based on the recommendations of the State Finance Commission. Under Article 243-I of the Constitution of India, the Governor of a state is required to constitute a State Finance Commission (SFC) every five years. The SFC makes recommendations to the Governor about the principles that should govern the distribution of tax proceeds – taxes, duties, levies, toll fee collected by the state between the state and its PRIs and ULBs. Further, the SFC also recommends measures for the overall improvement of the finances of the local self-governments. Despite the above provisions for strengthening the financial position of the PRIs and ULBs, they suffer from resource crunch. In India, PRIs rely overwhelmingly, to the extent of about 95%, on devolution, and their reliance on their own resources at about 6% is way below that of 40% for third-tier governments in Brazil and Germany. Further, the per capita own revenue collected by urban local governments is about 3% of the urban per capita income while the corresponding number for rural local governments is just 0.1%. Also, ULBs’ revenues are stuck at an incredibly low level of about 1% of GDP compared with levels ranging 4% to 7% in several emerging economies. Thus, there is a need to strengthen the financial position of the local self-government institutions in India. The following steps could be taken in this regard:

• Broadening their tax jurisdiction: The Standing Committee on Rural Development (Chaired by Dr P. Venugopal) recommended that the tax jurisdiction of the PRIs in India should be broadened and should include subjects such as fuel and fodder, non-conventional energy sources, rural electrification including distribution of electricity, non-formal education, small scale industries, etc., which could allow the Panchayats to make an effective plan of economic development and implement schemes for social justice. Similar provisions should be made for ULBs.
• Better monitoring of devolution of funds to local self-governments: The Central government should monitor the release and expenditure of the Finance Commission grants to ensure that there is no delay in their release. Further, local audits should be carried at regular intervals to reduce delays in Finance Commission grants to the institutions of local self- government.
• Capacity building: Capacity building of the existing staff and recruitment of new staff to fill up vacancies is necessary to make the functioning of local self-governments more efficient and for better utilisation of financial resources.
• Amendment of Article 280 of the Constitution: In its existing format, this Article is discriminatory to local bodies, as it denies them access to the ‘divisible pool of resources’, and consequently a place in the country’s fiscal framework.

The above steps are urgently required to strengthen the institutions of local self-government in India and consequently empower the citizens at the grassroots level.

Answer: Reforms in civil services are a continuous process and several initiatives have been taken in recent years such as the introduction of a multi-stakeholder feedback (MSF) performance evaluation, dispensing with interviews for lower-level positions, introduction of online mechanisms for appraisals and filing of various returns by employees, implementation of e-office, etc. Several constraints impede the development of a highly efficient, transparent and accountable civil service, as explained below: Size and Structure of bureaucracy: Since independence, the number of ministries and the size of associated bureaucracy have increased considerably, due to which:

• Civil servants are spending more time in clarifying their jurisdictional rights and boundaries, clearing their decisions through increasingly complex internal processes, and coordinating their activities through an increasing number of agencies.
• It is difficult to dismiss a government employee who has tenure guarantees.

Recruitment:

• There is very little stress on testing managerial skills of the candidate at recruitment level.
• Generalist civil servants are occupying even those positions requiring specialized skills.
• In case of lateral recruitment, the sensitive issues include the offer of market-related salaries and the process of selection.
• It has been argued by some that identities based on ethnicity, caste, region, gender etc. are grounds for ‘groupism’ and ‘favouritism’ within the services, and may also become considerations for transfers and postings, at times.

Human Resource Management:

• The present promotion system is based on time-scale and is coupled by security of tenure. It therefore encourages complacency and a patronage system.
• The non-inclusion of incentives or disincentives for performance works as a major drawback.
• Frequent and arbitrary transfers, a poor work environment and decrepit housing and health facilities often works as a demotivating force.
• The Annual Confidential Reports is a non-transparent, subjective and unilateral mechanism of performance appraisal.
• Political interference and administrative acquiescence have also dented the professional fiber of the service. essional

Reform measures that needs to be taken: Recruitment Level

• Reduce the number of civil services: The existing 60 plus separate civil services at the central and state level needs to be reduced. Recruits should be placed in a central talent pool, which would then allocate candidates by matching their competencies and the job description of the post.
• Concomitantly, the number of exams for civil services may ideally be brought down to one with all India ranking. States may also be encouraged to use this pool for recruitments.
• Nurture specialization: Officers should be encouraged to cultivate specializations based on their education and skills early on in their careers. Longer tenure postings need to be made based on the officers’ expertise.

Training Level

• Reorient training: Alter the current system of training to meet job-outcome oriented goals. For instance, with economic activities, particularly services, being centered in cities, training should be reoriented for a better focus on managing urban areas and problems.
• Introduce mid-career training modules for all services. Strengthen online-avenues for training, and introduce mid-career exams/assessment.

Evaluation Level

• Consider replacing annual confidential reports (ACRs) with multi stakeholder feedback (MSF) to retain transparency and accountability.
• Review existing schemes and introduce new schemes of incentives for extraordinary performance.
• Develop benchmarks to assess the performance of officers and compulsorily retire those deemed unable to meet the benchmarks.

A paradigm shift in the nature of civil service/servants is required to cope up with the emerging demands and the changes in society and economy and to reorient them into a dynamic, efficient and accountable apparatus for public service delivery.